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Investment and Subsidies in French, Hungarian and Slovenian Agriculture  
 
ABSTRACT 
The article investigates the investment and financial constraints for French, Hungarian and 
Slovenian farms using FADN panel data with different econometric estimation approaches. 
Farm gross investment is positively associated with real sales growth and cash flow implying 
the absence of soft budget constraint. Gross farm investment is positively associated with 
investment subsidies. Specific results by country are found depending on farm indebtedness. 
Investment subsidies can mitigate some capital market imperfections in short-term, while on 
long-term what is crucial is farm sale ability to successfully compete in the output market 
gaining sufficient cash flow for farm competitive survival and investment.  
KEYWORDS: farm investment, soft budget constraint, investment subsidy, panel data analysis 
JEL classification: D81, D92, O12, Q12, C23 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a wealth of literature on the presence of capital market imperfections and their effects 
on firm investment in transition countries (e.g. Budina et al., 2000; Konings et al., 2003; Lizal 
and Svejnar, 2002; Rizov, 2004), and a few papers focusing on this issue for the agricultural 
sector in these countries (Petrick, 2004; Latruffe, 2005; Bojnec and Latruffe, 2007; Bakucs et 
al., 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). This research provided evidence for existence of capital 
market imperfections during transition and after accession to the European Union (EU) 
(Rizov et al., 2001). In addition, some studies tested the persistence of soft budget constraint 
in transition economies. If soft budget constraint is still persistent, it may lead to a postponed 
restructuring (Kornai, 2001, Kornai et al. 2003). Soft budget constraint may be more 
important in agriculture because government supports to the farm sector are much higher than 
to firms in manufacturing. Cross-country comparison of investment behaviour is limited in 
the agricultural economics literature (except Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). Previous 
empirical analyses on investment activity in agriculture are mainly based on the augmented 
accelerator model or Euler equations. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the existence of soft budget constraint and credit market 
imperfections in three different EU countries, France, Hungary and Slovenia, using the 
augmented accelerator model with dynamic panel estimations. The historical development 
and the evolution of farms in the EU vary by countries, not only between Eastern and Western 
Europe, but also inside both regions. Within Eastern Europe these differentials in farm size 
and its growth are caused by the initial conditions that are linked to the agricultural history 
during the previous communist system and later institutional and policy reforms, while in 
Western Europe they are caused by the long-term institutional and policy evolutionary factors 
and market conditions. During the communist system Hungarian agriculture was collectivised 
and the average farm size has been all the time among the largest in Europe. In Slovenia the 
communist collectivisation failed and small-scale farm structure has remained among the 
smallest in Europe. In France farm structure has developed under market conditions and 
policy support, in particular the Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) measures introduced 
after the Second World War (Piet et al., 2010). While its farms are among the largest in 
Western Europe, they are smaller than in Hungary. Transition from centrally-planned to 
market economy in Slovenia has strengthened further development of small-scale family 
farms, while in Hungary a bi-modal farm structure has emerged with a greater number of 
small-scale family farms and a smaller number of large-scale corporate farms. The proportion 
of small farms in Slovenian agriculture is much higher than in Hungary. Therefore, our 
comparative analysis includes three countries with different historical-institutional 
developments and different farm structures: small-scale farms in Slovenia, medium-sized 
farms in France, and bi-modal small-scale and large-scale farms in Hungary.  
Our analysis is based on data from the French, Hungarian and Slovenian Farm Accountancy 
Data Networks (FADN). Previous research has provided evidence of capital market 
imperfections in these countries during transition (Bojnec and Latruffe, 2007; Bakucs et al., 
2009). Our paper highlights whether such imperfections persist after accession to the EU.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
The starting point of our empirical analysis is the standard augmented accelerator model in 
the following specification (Fazzari et al., 1988): 
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where subscript i denotes the i-th farm and subscript t denotes the t-th period, while ε is a 
stochastic element. Iit denotes gross investment of the i-th farm between periods t and t-1, 
which is calculated as the change in capital stock (net investment) plus depreciation in values; 
values in period t were deflated by the agricultural input price index for goods and services 
contributing to agricultural investment Kit-1 is the stock of capital, measured by all tangible 
assets, in the period t-1; values in the current period t are deflated by the agricultural input 
price index. Qit is the change in output sales value between period’s t and t-1; values in period 
t were deflated by the harmonized indices of consumer prices. CFit-1 denotes the real cash 
flow of the i-th farm, defined as before tax profits plus depreciation; values in period t were 
deflated by the harmonized indices of consumer prices. Dependent and explanatory variables 
are normalised by the stock of capital in time t-1 to control for size effects. 
The positive regression coefficient α2 on the cash-flow variable is generally interpreted as a 
sign for credit rationing, as firstly proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988). In addition, Lizal and 
Svejnar (2002) suggested to consider the coefficient α2 as an indication of the presence of the 
soft budget constraint, and proposed two interpretations for the latter: first, the weak version 
when the coefficient α2 is zero; firms have access to credit for investment irrespective of their 
profitability. Second, the strong version of the soft budget constraint, when the coefficient α2 
is negative; firms with poor financial performance can access bank loans more easily. 
Following Konings et al. (2003) we estimate equation (1) in first differences to control for 
unobserved farm level fixed effect and possible measurement error: 
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In our econometric estimations the baseline model is the standard augmented accelerator 
model (equation (2)). We then extend our model specification to include investment subsidies 
related to capital stock as an additional explanatory variable in a separate model.  
In addition to full sample estimate, we use farm characteristics to classify farms by increasing 
vs. decreasing real sales, and by high debt and low debt farms. Similar as Benjamin and 
Phimister (2002), we define high debt and low debt farms with debt-to-asset ratio greater than 
0.3 and less than 0.2 respectively, to test the sensitivity of our estimation. We also imposed 
outlier rules by removing farms from econometric estimates if the investment capital ratio is 
above 99% in absolute value (Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). 
In the empirical analysis we use three econometric estimators. First, we employ standard 
static panel models using a Hausman test to identify whether a random or a fixed effect model 
is appropriate. Second, we employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), also referred to as 
GMM-system estimator. Windmeijer (2005) proposes a finite sample correction that provides 
more accurate estimates of the variance of the two-step GMM estimator. As the t-tests based 
on these corrected standard errors are found to be more reliable, the paper estimates the 
coefficients using the finite sample correction. Finally, we have an unbalanced panel dataset 
for the five year length period between 2003 and 2007 for France and between 2004 and 2008 
for Hungary and Slovenia. Thus to correct the unbalanced nature of our data, in a third model, 
we estimate equation (2) with a generalised version of bias corrected LSDVC estimator 
proposed by Bruno (2005a)1. The author defines a selection indicator rit such that rit =1 if (yit, 
xit) is observed and rit =0 otherwise. From this the dynamic selection rule s (rit, ri,t-1) is 
created, that selects only the observations that are usable for the dynamic model, namely those 
for which both current values and one-time lagged values are observable. As it is good 
practice to check the sensitivity of empirical results, we will present and compare the results 
from the fixed effects estimator, GMM estimator, and LSDVC estimator. The French sample 
being too large for such estimator, it is applied to a random sample of half the size of the 
initial size. 
3. DATA 
The data analysis is based on French, Hungarian and Slovenian FADN that includes farms 
above two European Size Units (ESUs; one ESU is equivalent to 1,200 euros of gross 
margin). The time span used for analysis is 2004-2008 for Hungary and Slovenia and 2003-
2007 for France. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the data used. Gross investment to 
capital is the highest for Hungarian and the lowest for Slovenian FADN farms, but of course 
varies by farms. The data shows disinvestments by some farms in Slovenia and France, but 
not in Hungary. Real sale growth to capital is the highest for French and the lowest for 
Slovenian FADN farms. Real cash flow to capital is the highest for Slovenian and the lowest 
for French FADN farms. Similarly as real sale growth to capital, also real cash flow to capital 
vary by farms from negative to positive values.  Real investment subsidy in period t-1 to 
capital is on average similar for French, Hungarian or Slovenian FADN farms.   
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the whole period 2004-2008 
  Hungary (in euro) 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment to 
capital 1
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8367 0.096 0.220 0.000 11.633 
Sale growth to 
capital 1
it
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K 
 
8367 0.253 0.230 -0.939 8.004 
Cash flow to 
capital 
1
1
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8367 0.014 0.275 -10.784 3.593 
Investment 
subsidy in period 
t-1 to capital  8367 0.004 0.029 0.000 1.080 
  Slovenia (in euro) 
Investment to 
capital 1
it
it
I
K 
 
2237 0.049 0.097 -0.206 11.633 
                                               
1 We apply the Stata programme xtlsdvc developed by Bruno (2005b) using Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. 
Sale growth to 
capital 1
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2237 0.096 0.180 -0.360 8.004 
Cash flow to 
capital 
1
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2237 0.031 0.182 -1.076 3.593 
Investment 
subsidy in period 
t-1 to capital  2237 0.004 0.022 0.000 1.080 
  France (in euro) 
Investment to 
capital 1
it
it
I
K 
 
25782 0.076 0.174 -3.440 12.500 
Sale growth to 
capital 1
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Q
K 
 
25782 0.299 0.292 -0.729 12.049 
Cash flow to 
capital 
1
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25782 0.131 0.246 -12.325 9.370 
Investment 
subsidy in period 
t-1 to capital  25782 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.868 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Results of the Hausman test suggest using fixed effect models. The standard augmented 
accelerator model confirms a positive association between farm investment and real sale 
growth and cash flow variables, respectively (Table 2). Therefore, our econometric results 
reject the validity of the soft budget constraint for French, Hungarian and Slovenian farms. 
However, they reveal the presence of capital market imperfections. Farm investments are 
positively associated with investment subsidies in time t in France, Hungary and Slovenia, but 
negatively for investment subsidies in time t-1 for France and Hungary.  This implies that 
current investment subsidies are important for investment decisions, but except for Slovenia, 
they are not anticipated as a factor for long-term farm investment behaviour, where a more 
crucial role is plaid by farm output market conditions with real sales to growth and cash 
inflow into the farm household. 
Table 2. Fixed effect model results for the full samples  
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator model 
(equation  (1)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
 Full sample Full sample Full sample 
HUNGARY    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.126*** 0.147*** 0.125*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.081*** 
Investment subsidy  2.543*** -0.173** 
Constant 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 
N 5911 5911 5911 
R2 0.0015 0.1134 0.0011 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SLOVENIA    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.314*** 0.267*** 0.327*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 
Investment subsidy  1.450*** 0.527** 
Constant 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
N 1407 1407 1407 
R2 0.1192 0.2049 0.1306 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FRANCE    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 
Investment subsidy  1.633*** -0.668*** 
Constant -0.009** -0.014*** -0.005 
N 16992 16992 16992 
R2 0.0157 0.0328 0.0142 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by 
capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Following Benjamin and Phimister (2002) we impose outlier rules to exclude farms if their 
investment to capital ratio is above 99% in absolute value (Table 3). The results do not 
change substantially. The regression coefficients for real sale growth are of a positive sign 
and significant in all specified cases. The regression coefficients for the cash flow variable 
remains with the positive sign. For Slovenia, the regression coefficients are slightly lower and 
closer to zero. The regression coefficients for investment subsidy in the current period t are of 
a positive sign and significant, but the coefficients for investment subsidy in the previous 
period t-1 are not significant for Hungary and Slovenia, and negative and significant for 
France.  
 
Table 3. Fixed effect model results for the full samples without farms for which the 
investment capital ratio is above 99% in absolute value 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  (1)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
HUNGARY    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.101*** 0.118*** 0.101*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
Investment subsidy  2.381*** -0.044 
Constant 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 
N 5883 5883 5883 
R2 0.0016 0.1106 0.0014 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SLOVENIA    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.339*** 0.282*** 0.337*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.023* 0.030** 0.022* 
Investment subsidy  1.231*** -0.292 
Constant 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
N 1403 1403 1403 
R2 0.1316 0.2221 0.1279 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FRANCE    
Sale growth t,t-1 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
Investment subsidy  1.260*** -0.375*** 
Constant 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 
N 16940 16940 16940 
R2 0.0142 0.0351 0.0121 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by 
capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Moreover, we split our FADN sample into two sub-samples depending on farm indebtedness 
to classify farms as high debt vs. low debt farms that can be considered to differ in their 
financial constraints. Similar as Benjamin and Phimister (2002) we define high debt and low 
debt farms with debt-to-asset ratio greater than 0.3 and less than 0.2, respectively. 
The results differ by countries and by these two debt groups of farms. For France, gross farm 
investment is positively and significantly associated with real sale growth in the current 
period t for both groups of farms with high and farm with low debts (Table 4). This finding 
holds also for farms with low debt in Hungary and Slovenia, but the regression coefficients 
for these two countries are insignificant for high debt farms. While investments in low debt 
farms are market driven, it is less clear for high debt farms in Hungary and Slovenia. 
The regression coefficients for the cash flow variables, irrespective to the model specification, 
are of a positive sign and significant implying an absence of soft budget constraint but a 
presence of capital market imperfections. In Hungary and France, the coefficient is much 
higher for farms with low debt than for farms with high debt, revealing that lower 
indebtedness constrains more investment decisions in these countries. However, the opposite 
is found for Slovenia. The regression coefficients for the investment subsidy variable are 
mixed. They are of a positive sign and significant when pertaining to investment subsidy at 
time t for Hungary and France as well as for Slovenia in the case of farms with low debt. On 
the contrary, for Hungary they are insignificant for lagged investment subsidy variable. For 
Slovenia, for high debt farms the regression coefficient pertaining to lagged investment 
subsidy variable is insignificant, while for low debt farms they are significant, but of a 
negative sign. The opposite holds for French FADN farms: of a negative sign and significant 
for farms with high debt and insignificant for farms with low debt. The regression coefficients 
for the lagged investment subsidy variables imply different long-term investment behaviour 
of farm by countries and by the degree of indebtedness of farms. While for Hungary there is 
less significant long-term farm investment behaviour for these two groups of farms, the 
Slovenian low debt farms and French high debt farms seem to be a cautious in their long-term 
farm investment behaviour.   
 
Table 4. Fixed effect model results for the sub-samples depending on farm indebtedness 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation  
(1) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
Including investment 
subsidy at t-1 
 
Farms with 
high debt 
Farms 
with low 
debt 
Farms 
with high 
debt 
Farms with 
low debt 
Farms with 
high debt 
Farms 
with low 
debt 
HUNGARY       
Sale growth t,t-1 0.073 0.160*** 0.100** 0.172*** 0.074 0.160*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.097*** 0.169*** 0.102*** 0.162*** 0.102*** 0.172*** 
Investment subsidy   2.774*** 2.258*** 0.181 0.085 
Constant 0.101*** 0.033*** 0.078*** 0.024*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 
N 1214 3939 1214 3939 1214 3939 
R2 0.0065 0.0085 0.0637 0.0876 0.0056 0.0090 
SLOVENIA       
Sale growth t,t-1 0.271 0.337*** 0.982 0.325*** 0.288 0.335*** 
Cash flow t-1 1.128*** 0.023* 1.091** 0.031*** 1.120*** 0.023* 
Investment subsidy   -2.061 1.135*** 0.331 -0.470** 
Constant 0.041 0.018*** -0.074 0.014*** 0.036 0.020*** 
N 20 1361 20 1361 20 1361 
R2 0.3203 0.1211 0.3734 0.2189 0.3225 0.1125 
FRANCE       
Sale growth t,t-1 0.220*** 0.240*** 0.218*** 0.238*** 0.215*** 0.240*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.062*** 0.589*** 0.060*** 0.587*** 0.0622*** 0.589*** 
Investment subsidy   1.543*** 1.634*** -1.184*** 0.045 
Constant 0.009* 
-
0.093*** 0,003 -0.097 0.016*** 
-
0.093*** 
N 9939 4302 9939 4302 9939 4302 
R2 0.0268 0.0028 0.0573 0.0048 0.023 0.0029 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by 
capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
The re-estimated adapted standard augmented models by the dynamic panel data model 
(GMM-SYS) confirm the positive and significant association between farm gross investment 
and farm real sale growth (Table 5). These results clearly imply that the FADN farm 
investment behaviour are driven by competitive output market conditions and the farm 
abilities to sell output and invest in such a market environment. Moreover, except for 
Slovenia, farm gross investment is positively and significantly associated with cash flow, 
confirming for France and Hungary the absence of the soft budget constraints for the FADN 
farms. For Slovenia, the regression coefficients for the cash flow variable are insignificant. 
Finally, farm gross investment is found to be a positively and significantly associated with 
investment subsidies for France, Hungary and Slovenia. To sum up, these GMM-SYS results 
reject the validity of the soft budget constraints for French and Hungarian FADN farms and 
confirm the presence of capital market imperfections in these two countries. 
 
Table 5. Dynamic Panel Model (GMM-SYS) results for the full sample 
 
Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
HUNGARY   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.233*** 0.227*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.529*** 0.457*** 
Investment subsidy  2.954*** 
Constant -0.027* -0.030** 
N 5911 5911 
Wald test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.5729 0.1741 
SLOVENIA   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.320*** 0.252** 
Cash flow t-1 0.074 0.054 
Investment subsidy  0.946*** 
Constant 0.013 0.018 
N 1407 1407 
Wald test (p–value) 0.0043 0.0004 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0250 0.0197 
FRANCE   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.233*** 0.226*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.233*** 0.212*** 
Investment subsidy  1.772*** 
Constant -0.035** -0.035*** 
N 16992 16992 
Wald test (p–value) 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.3443 0.3760 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by 
capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
The sample selection models based on the bootstrapped standard errors estimates provide all 
significant regression parameters at 1% significance level except for cash flow coefficient in 
France (Table 6). The positive association between gross farm investment and real sale 
growth is confirmed in all three countries, confirming that farms based their investment 
decisions on market conditions. The positive association between gross farm investment and 
cash flow also rejects the validity of the soft budget constraints but confirms the presence of 
capital market imperfections in Hungary and Slovenia. No significance is found for the 
French sample. Finally, gross farm investment is positively associated with investment 
subsidies in the three countries. 
 
Table 6. LSDVC sample selection models results for the full sample 
 Standard augmented 
accelerator (equation (2)) 
Including investment 
subsidy at t 
HUNGARY   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.154*** 0.175*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.228*** 0.233*** 
Investment subsidy  2.656*** 
N 5883 5883 
SLOVENIA   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.314*** 0.279*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.063*** 0.065*** 
Investment subsidy  1.471*** 
N 1407 1407 
FRANCE (half sample)   
Sale growth t,t-1 0.182*** 0.174*** 
Cash flow t-1 0.024 0.029 
Investment subsidy  2.360*** 
Dependent variable: gross investmentt,t-1 to capital. All explanatory variables are divided by 
capital. N: number of observations. ***/**/*: statistically significant, respectively at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, based on bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We use an adapted augmented accelerator model of gross farm investment for a panel data of 
French, Hungarian and Slovenian FADN farms to investigate the impact of real sale growth, 
cash flow and investment subsidy on gross farm investment, during the period 2003-2007 for 
France and 2004-2008 for Hungary and Slovenia. We use different econometric estimation 
approaches to test the sensitivity and robustness of our econometric results. 
In a spite of different nature of FADN farms in France, Hungary and Slovenia, their 
investment behaviour does not differentiate substantially. Farm gross investment is positively 
associated with real sale growth suggesting that farm investment decisions are based on 
market conditions in all the three countries. The association is also of a positive sign for the 
cash flow variable in general, implying the absence of the soft budget constraints and the 
presence of capital market imperfections limiting investment expenditures. As expected, some 
differentials are also found between farms with low and high debts, which vary between the 
analysed countries. Gross farm investment is positively associated with investment subsidies. 
Public programmes to support farm investment (investment subsidies) seem to be successful 
in enhancing investment in these countries in short-term, but farms investment behaviour 
pertaining to investment subsidies is more cautious on long-term. This implies that investment 
subsidies can mitigate some capital market imperfections such as interest rate volatility, but 
on long-term what is crucial is farm competitiveness and ability to successfully compete in 
the output market gaining sufficient cash flow for farm competitive survival and investment 
and thus also farm growth.  
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